Proposals to Curtail Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners: Collateral Attack on the Great Writ by Pollak, Louis H.
PROPOSALS TO CURTAIL FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS FOR
STATE PRISONERS: COLLATERAL ATTACK ON THE
GREAT WRIT
LOUIS H. POLLAKt
"We propose now to show this committee by illustrative cases what
happens when Federal courts intervene in behalf of prisoners convicted in
State courts by means of Federal habeas corpus. There are literally hun-
dreds of cases from all States, and we can only select a few."
"In one respect this [Leyra v. Denno] is the most significant case of
all that we have discussed in that it shows how a case can be tried in the
State courts, going all the way to the highest Appellate Court of New
York, a new trial granted, the case tried again, and appealed to the
Appellate Court of the State of New York, and affirmed. All State remedies
having been exhausted and the case having been fully tried in all the courts
of the State of New York, with certiorari denied by the Supreme Court
of the United States, Leyra then sued out a petition for writ of habeas
corpus in one of the United States district courts of New York, and the
case then went the full routine of Federal hearings through the circuit
court of appeals to the Supreme Court of the United States. The out-
standing significance of this case is that it shows and clearly demonstrates
that the same questions can be litigated fully in all the courts of the State,
the petitioner can then ask the Supreme Court of the United States for
certiorari to pass on these same questions, and the Supreme Court of the
United States refuses the application for certiorari. The identical questions
(competency of confession) have been litigated through all the Federal
courts and the Supreme Court of the United States then grants certiorari,
although it had previously refused to do so when the matter was going
through the State courts and on the same question of confessions; the
certiorari, however, is granted when the case comes through the Federal
courts on the same question of confessions, and the Supreme Court of the
United States then reverses the case and orders another trial. We do not
know the final disposition of the case ... 
TiE PROBLEM
T.E quoted indictment of the tedious proceedings in Leyra v. Denno 2 is part
of a long memorandum submitted by Ralph Moody, Assistant Attorney General
of North Carolina, to the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives
tAssociate Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
The author wishes to acknowledge the invaluable assistance of Louise E. Farr, Re-
search Associate, Yale Law School.
1. Excerpts from Statement of Ralph Moody, Assistant Attorney General of North
Carolina, in Support of H.R. 5649, Hearings on H.R. 5649 before Subcommittee No. 3 of
the House Committee on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. at 45, 51 (1955) (hereinafter
cited as Hearings).
2. 347 U.S. 556 (1954).
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on June 24, 1955. Mr. Moody submitted the memorandum on behalf of the
National Association of Attorneys General in support of a then pending bill
designed to curtail the jurisdiction of federal courts to inquire, on habeas
corpus, into the propriety of state court criminal convictions. The specific legis-
lative proposal, H.R. 5649,3 passed the House of Representatives but died in
the Senate Judiciary Committee when the Eighty-fourth Congress, on July 27,
1956, adjourned sine die. But the problem troubling Mr. Moody and his col-
leagues did not die with the bill. In all likelihood the next Congress will be
confronted with similar legislation. Mr. Moody's quarrel with the existing
latitude of federal habeas corpus poses issues demanding the devoted attention
of those concerned with the smooth functioning of the federal system. Yet the
issues are not new-they are as old as the Constitution.
It is familiar history that the Constitutional Convention, after vigorous and
prescient debate, recognized that the new national government, superimposed
on pre-existing states jealous of their sovereignty, must be endowed with power
to establish its own judicial system-a system necessarily overlapping the func-
tions of the existing state courts. It was, to be sure, the plain intent of the framers
that Congress should "make use of the State Tribunals whenever it could be
done, with safety to the general interest." 4 But emphasis on the desirability of re-
straint in establishing federal jurisdiction only underscored the fact that con-
current judicial power portended conflict-and conflict under the supremacy
clause could in the last analysis only mean that the national tribunals would
have ultimate revisory power.
Transforming this theoretical imperative of revisory power into reality could
not have been easy in any event; but it necessarily provoked profoundest paro-
chial antagonism in criminal cases. When the Supreme Court issued its writ
of error to review Corn Tassel's death sentence, the Georgia authorities showed
their sovereign contempt for the Court's process by executing the defendant
and thereby effectively mooting his appeal.5 But that was in 1830-only four-
teen years after Justice Story, reversing a recalcitrant Virginia Court of
Appeals, indelibly blueprinted the Supreme Court's power to overturn judg-
ments of state courts, 6 and a scant nine years after Chief Justice Marshall first
asserted the Supreme Court's power to review a state criminal conviction.1
Today, although Georgia and Virginia mutter threats of "interposition" against
3. 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955).
The bill is set forth verbatim in the text at p. 57 infra.
4. The language is that of Roger Sherman, advocating the successful compromise that
gave Congress discretion to establish federal courts inferior to the Supreme Court. See
2 FARRAND, THE REcoRDs OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 45-46 (1911).
5. Warren, Legislative and Judicial Attacks on the Supreme Court of the United
States-A History of the Twenty-fifth Section of the Judiciary Act, 47 Am. L. REv. 161,
167 (1913).
6. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) *304 (1816).
7. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) *264 (1821) (motion to dismiss writ of
error overruled; conviction then affirmed on merits).
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Supreme Court decisions in other fields,8 no serious question is raised about the
Court's appellate authority to set aside state criminal convictions secured in
violation of federally protected rights.
The question vexing Mr. Moody-and currently besetting judges, legislators,
prosecutors and convicts-is the propriety and scope of an alternative and
allegedly less palatable form of federal intervention: federal district court juris-
diction to make collateral inquiry into state court criminal convictions. Since
1867, the so-called "inferior" federal courts have been empowered, on habeas
corpus, to reopen "all cases where any person may be restrained of his or her
liberty in violation of the Constitution, or of any treaty or law of the United
States. .. ." Initially, this auxiliary form of federal inquiry was only a minor
nuisance to state authorities, since conventionally the state's burden on habeas
corpus was merely to show that the state court was one of competent jurisdic-
tion.10 Gradually, however, the federal inquiry on habeas corpus has widened.
The federal judge's job, the Supreme Court announced in 1915, was "to look
beyond forms and inquire into the very substance of the matter, to the extent
of deciding whether the prisoner has been deprived of his liberty without due
process of law. . . ."" This formula, coupled with latter-day judicial amplifi-
cation of the content of "due process of law," laid the basis for what has now
become a substantial volume of habeas corpus applications from state prisoners
serving jail terms or awaiting execution.
Typically, the applicant will urge that the state trial was fatally tainted by
lack of counsel,12 by a coerced confession,
13 by officially suborned perjury,14
by discriminatory jury selection, 15 or by other deprivations of Fourteenth
Amendment rights.' 6 If (1) the moving papers adequately set forth facts rais-
8. See Georgia House Resolution No. 185, 1 RAcE RELATIONS L. REP. 438 (1956),
and Virginia Senate Joint Resohtion No. 3, 1 RAcE RELATioNS L. REP. 445 (1956), both
directed at the Supreme Court's decisions in the School Segregation Cases, 347 U.S. 483,
497 (1954), and 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
9. Act of February 5, 1867, 14 STAT. 385. The statutory language has been
altered in detail but not in substance. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(3) (1952); cf. 28 U.S.C. § 2254
(1952).
The Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 was passed some months after Congress proposed the
Fourteenth Amendment to the states but over a year before the ratification process was
completed. The act was plainly intended to help safeguard the new statutory and constitu-
tional rights created after the Civil War. See Note, The Freedom Writ-The Expanded
Use of Federal Habeas Corpus, 61 HARv. L. Ra-v. 657, 659 (1948).
10. See, e.g., Ex parte Bridges, 4 Fed. Cas. No. 1862, at 106 (C.C.N.D. Ga. 1875).
11. Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 331 (1915); see Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S.
86 (1923).
12. Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672 (1948); House v. Mayo, 324 U.S. 42 (1945).
13. Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954).
14. Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114, 115-16 (1-944) ; Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103
(1935).
15. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
16. Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947) (double jeopardy and
cruel and unusual punishment) ; Cochran v. Kansas, 316 U.S. 255 (1942) (suppression by
prison officials of appeals documents); Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915) (mob
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ing substantial federal questions, (2) the applicant (a) has raised the federal
questions in a state proceeding and has unsuccessfully sought certiorari from
the adverse state judgment,17 or (b) has no available avenue of effective state
collateral attack,' 8 and (3) the federal questions are ones not litigated by a
federal court on a prior application for habeas corpus,19 the district court must
hear and determine the issues presented.
From July 1940 through June 1941-what may be regarded as the year of
transition from the "old" to the "new" Supreme Court-federal district courts
received 127 applications for habeas corpus from persons in state custody.
20
In 1955, after fifteen years of heightened Supreme Court insistence on fair
criminal procedures, the volume of applications had increased over five-fold-
to 660.21 But the percentage of applications in which relief was granted was
never large and has not risen. On the contrary-in 1946 (when applications
were at about the 500 mark) only 2.8 per cent of the applications had some
measure of success, and by 1954 even that figure had shrunk to 1.3 per cent.22
Indeed, the proportion of applicants whom the federal courts finally order dis-
charged from state custody probably does not exceed the miniscule figure of
.15 per cent-about one applicant per year.23 Moreover-and this tellingly un-
derscores the insufficiency of the average application-from 1941 to 1954 only
7.3 per cent of the cases reached the hearing stage, and in the past few years
this latter figure has fallen to about 4 per cent.2
It has not been hard to infer from statistics of this kind "that literally hundreds
and thousands of phoney habeas corpus proceedings . . . now clutter up and
confuse an already overcrowded federal docket .... "2 Acceptance of this
conclusion has led not unnaturally to the view that current habeas corpus
practice squanders the energies and budgets of federal courts and state
law enforcement officials. It accomplishes nothing, so it is urged, except edu-
cating idle convicts in the niceties of criminal procedure and delaying society's
rightful day of retribution in capital cases like Leyra v. Denno.
26
domination of trial). See, generally, Note, Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 55
COLUM. L. RPv. 196 (1955).
17. Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200 (1950), construing 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1952).
18. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1952).
19. 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (1952).
20. Hearings 24, Table 1. The statistics are the product of studies of habeas corpus
litigation by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts.
21. DIaRCTOR OF THE ADnmISTRATIvE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, ANN.
REP. 1955, at 169, Table C3 (1956).
22. Hearings 25, Table 3.
23. See the comprehensive discussion of habeas corpus practice contained in Justice
Frankfurter's separate opinion in Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 498 (1953) ; this opinion,
to which several references are hereafter made under the designation "separate opinion,"
is to be distinguished from the dissent on the merits filed by Justice Frankfurter in the
same case and companion cases. 344 U.S. at 554.
24. Hearings 24, Table 2.
25. 102 CONG. PZEc. 801-02 (daily ed. Jan. 19, 1956).
26. 347 U.S. 556 (1954) ; see text at note 1 supra and notes 56-66 infra.
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Reenforcing these pragmatic considerations is the notion that there is some
constitutional imbalance about a procedure that permits federal trial courts to
review state appellate courts. In the considered view of the Conference of State
Chief Justices, "Orderly Federal procedure under our dual system of Govern-
ment should require that a final judgment of a State's highest court be subject
to review or reversal only by the Supreme Court of the United States. '" 2 7 And
many federal judges appear to acquiesce in this view: "[0 ] ur sphere of super-
intendence should not extend to state police activities; there the state courts
should have the burden, subject only to certiorari in the Supreme Court in the
few cases where needed."28
In brief, then, critics of current habeas corpus practice have drawn two con-
clusions:
"[U]nder the expanded concept of the use of the writ, the dockets of the
Federal district courts [have] become clogged with thousands of ground-
less, if not fraudulent claims .... -29
"[It] seems incongruous, when viewed in the light of the United States
Constitution, to have the actions of our highest State courts reviewed by
our lower Federal district courts, for it was never the intention of our
Founding Fathers, in writing that Constitution, to have the writ of habeas
corpus used as a writ of review by the lower Federal courts to review
State court actions."Y
30
Each conclusion seems suspect:
As to the first, there is every reason to suppose that a large proportion of
the allegedly "frivolous" habeas corpus cases are merely testimonials to the
difficulties of proof encountered in reconstructing trials long since forgotten.
Even the most competent and best compensated lawyer faces enormous odds
in piecing together inadequate trial transcripts and in gleaning the truth from
memories of judges, clerks and prosecutors whose own past conduct is thus put
at issue. And the prisoner who must manage his own litigation is almost hope-
lessly handicapped. 31 Indeed, the probability that the proportion of meritorious
cases is significantly greater than the statistics indicate suggests that what is
needed is to provide more rigorous federal judicial scrutiny rather than to con-
front the prisoner with new obstacles to relief.
Moreover, the much-advertised burden this class of litigation imposes on
federal courts is largely illusory: 660 cases a year, only about 30 of which get
27. Hearings 32 (resolution of 1952 Conference).
28. Circuit Judge Clark, concurring in United States ex rel. Caminito v. Murphy, 222
F.2d 698, 706 (2d Cir. 1955). Circuit Judge Parker has been a consistent critic of prevail-
ing practice. See, e.g., Parker, Limiting the Abuse of Habeas Corpus, 8 F.R.D. 171, 174
(1949), and see note 36 infra and accompanying text.
29. Report of the Habeas Corpus Committee of the Conference of Chief Justices, Aug.
14, 1954, quoted in Hearings 108, 109.
30. H.R. REP. No. 1200, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1955) (hereinafter cited as REPoRT).
31. Cf. Griffin v. Illinois, 24 U.S.L. WEEK 4209 (U.S. April 23, 1956) (denial of equal
protection in refusing indigent convicts free trial transcripts in noncapital cases).
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to hearing,32 cannot seriously impede the calendars of eighty-six district courts
which currently receive 48,000 new civil cases (habeas corpus cases are classi-
fied as civil) and 33,000 new criminal cases annually.
33
The second conclusion-that the framers never contemplated using lower
federal courts to review state courts-is unwarranted. Hamilton, in his classic
exposition of the character of the proposed federal judicial structure, dealt with
the possibility in explicit terms:
"But could an appeal be made to lie from the state courts, to the sub-
ordinate federal judicatories? . . . The only outlines described for [the
lower federal courts] are, that they shall be 'inferior to the supreme court,'
and that they shall not exceed the specified limits of the federal judiciary.
Whether their authority shall be original or appellate, or both, is not
declared. All this seems to be left to the discretion of the legislature. And
this being the case, I perceive at present no impediment to the establish-
ment of an appeal from the state courts, to the subordinate national tri-
bunals; and many advantages attending the power of doing it may be
imagined." 34
In any event, as Justice Frankfurter had recent occasion to demonstrate, it is
doubtful that habeas corpus jurisdiction can be usefully analogized to appellate
review:
"Insofar as this jurisdiction enables federal district courts to entertain
claims that State Supreme Courts have denied rights guaranteed by the
United States Constitution, it is not a case of a lower court sitting in judg-
ment on a higher court. It is merely one aspect of respecting the Su-
premacy Clause of the Constitution whereby federal law is higher than
State law. It is for the Congress to designate the member in the hierarchy
of the federal judiciary to express the higher law. The fact that Congress
has authorized district courts to be the organ of the higher law rather than
a Court of Appeals, or exclusively this Court, does not mean that it allows
a lower court to overrule a higher court. It merely expresses the choice of
Congress how the superior authority of federal law should be asserted."35
Be this as it may, those hostile to existing habeas corpus jurisdiction are
persuaded that in all but the most extraordinary circumstances a prisoner in
state custody should be confined to Supreme Court review, on certiorari, of the
highest state court judgment, whether this be a review of the conviction or of
denial of some state collateral remedy. This view was codified in H.R.
5649, a bill drafted by a Habeas Corpus Committee of the Judicial Conference
32. See text at notes 21 and 24 supra. In a study of twenty-four habeas corpus cases
in which hearings were held, Justice Frankfurter found that in two-thirds of the cases the
hearing lasted no more than an hour, and that in only one case, which lasted three days, did
the hearing last more than four hours. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 514, 529 (1953)
(appendix to separate opinion).
33. DIREcTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, ANN.
REP. 1955, at 166, 195 (1956).
34. THE FEDERALIST No. 82, at 379 (1842 ed.) (Hamilton).
35. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 510 (1953) (separate opinion).
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of the United States, 6 and approved, as the House Report observed, by "The
Judicial Conference of the United States, composed of the Chief Justice of the
United States and the presiding judges of the several courts of appeals, the
Conference of Chief Justices of the several States, the Association of States
Attorney General, and the section on judicial administration of the American
Bar Association. It also has the support and approval of the United States
Department of Justice.
' 37
Not too surprisingly, the House Judiciary Committee-despite opposition
from the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People,35 the
American Civil Liberties Union, and a lone judge, Jerome Frank 9 -
36. The Committee is composed of Circuit Judges Parker (Chairman), Phillips and
Stephens, and District Judges Hooper, Vaught and Wyzanski.
37. REPORT 1.
38. Thurgood Marshall, special counsel for the NAACP, explained in his testimony
that the NAACP opposed H.R. 5649 not because it was in any specific sense directed
against Negroes but because its total impact would be to "lessen the law's protection of
civil rights. . . ." Hearings 79.
In fact, as was noted on the House floor, 102 CONG. REc. 798 (daily ed. Jan. 19, 1956),
the bulk of habeas corpus applications are not from the South. Nearly 25 per cent of cur-
rent applications come from Illinois, Hearings 24, Table 1, which, significantly, has until
very recently been plagued with so obscure a system of post-conviction remedies as to in-
vite the censure of the Supreme Court. See Marino v. Ragen, 332 U.S. 561, 563 (1947)
(concurring opinion) ; Young v. Ragen, 337 U.S. 235 (1949). Efforts have been made to
clarify and simplify these Illinois procedures. See Statement of James C. Murray, Repre-
sentative from Illinois, Hearings 65; cf. Jennings v. Illinois, 342 U.S. 104 (1951).
39. Judge Frank's extensive concern with problems of remedying lawlessness in
state law enforcement is mirrored in opinions such as his ultimately vindicated dissent in
United States ex rel. Leyra v. Denno, 208 F.2d 605, 611. (2d Cir. 1953), rev'd, 347 U.S.
556 (1954), and his majority opinion in United States ex rel. Caminito v. Murphy, 222
F.2d 698 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 896 (1955). His opposition to H.R. 5649
was set forth in a letter (Hearings 16-17) to Congressman Celler, Chairman of the House
Judiciary Committee, emphasizing the serious implications of any significant alteration in
habeas corpus practice:
... I wish to express a serious objection solely to those provisions of H.R. 5649
which would, except in rare instances, limit review to a petition for certiorari ad-
dressed to the United States Supreme Court. My reasons, briefly stated, are as fol-
lows:
"1. Experience has shown that the Supreme Court does not now have the time
carefully to consider all the many certiorari petitions filed with it. The result of the
provisions to which I refer will almost surely be that most efforts to obtain relief
will be denied, even when, on careful consideration, it would appear that there has
been a deprivation of Federal constitutional rights.
"2. The virtue of the now existing procedure is this: The Federal district court
and the Federal court of Appeals have fully canvassed the case before the Supreme
Court is asked to pass on it. The opinions of those lower courts greatly aid the
Supreme Court in determining whether to grant review.
"The recent case of Leyra v. Demo is illustrative .... Had the proposed statute
been in effect, the Supreme Court would not have had the benefit of the opinions of
the lower Federal courts, carefully canvassing the pertinent facts.
"3. It is urged by )roponents of the bill that it is unseemly for lower Federal
courts to set aside, in effect, judgments of conviction affirmed by the highest State
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reported the bill favorably.40 And on January 19, 1956, the bill passed the
House without opposition.
41
Although the bill was not acted on by the Senate prior to the adjournment
of the Eighty-fourth Congress, the widespread support it had enlisted suggests
that interest in its ultimate enactment will not cease. A summary of the bill
and an evaluation of its provisions are therefore in order.
THE PROPOSED SOLUTION: H.R. 5649
H.R. 5649, if adopted, would have added to Section 2254 of the Judicial
Code the following language:
"A Justice of the Supreme Court, a circuit judge or a district court or
judge shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf
of a person in custody pursuant to a judgment of a State court, only on a
ground which presents a substantial Federal constitutional question (1)
which was not theretofore raised and determined, (2) which there was no
fair and adequate opportunity theretofore to raise and have determined,
and (3) which cannot thereafter be raised and determined in a proceeding
in the State court, by an order or judgment subject to review by the Su-
preme Court of the United States on writ of certiorari.
"An order denying an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a per-
son in custody pursuant to a judgment of a State court shall be reviewable
only on a writ of certiorari by the Supreme Court of the United States.
The petition for the writ of certiorari shall be filed within thirty days after
the entry of such order."
The crux of the bill is the first paragraph. Under that paragraph, habeas
corpus could not issue if (a) the prisoner had a prior "fair and adequate op-
courts. The answer is that, whenever a lower Federal court so acts, the State may
seek certiorari in the United States Supreme Court, and that, usually, in such cir-
cumstances, certiorari is granted.
"4. To save the dignity of the State courts, and yet to meet my objection, the
proposed statute might provide that, whenever a petition for certiorari from a State
court's decision is presented, the Supreme Court may refer the matter to the appro-
priate Federal district court to hear and report the facts, and recommend legal con-
clusions, and that such report shall be reviewed by the appropriate Federal court of
appeals before the Supreme Court again considers the case. Such a provision would
furnish the Supreme Court with the views of the lower Federal courts.
"Since, however, the existing procedure achieves the same result, I think it would
be wiser to retain that procedure. ... "
Subsequent to the House Judiciary Committee hearings, Circuit Judge Denman ex-
pressed his opposition to H.R. 5649. In a Statement and Supplemental Statement filed
with the Senate Judiciary Committee in April and May, 1956, Judge Denman noted that
H.R. 5649, in conjunction with existing 28 U.S.C. § 1241 (a), would appear to confer on
the Supreme Court the intolerable burden of original jurisdiction, to the exclusion of
all other federal courts, over most habeas corpus applications now presented to the district
courts. That the Court could exercise original jurisdiction consistently with art. III
of the Constitution would seem doubtful in the extreme. Cf. Mooney v. Holohan, 294
U.S. 103 (1935), and note 73 infra.
40. 101 CoNG. REc. 9339 (1955) ; see also REPoRT.
41. 102 CoNG. REc. 797 (daily ed. Jan. 19,1956).
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portunity" to raise his federal questions in a state proceeding, whether or not
he utilized that opportunity, or (b) there is under the state procedure a pres-
ently available post-conviction remedy in which the federal questions could be
raised and preserved for submission to the Supreme Court on certiorari. 42
The premise of the bill is that "where adequate procedure is provided by
State law for the handling of such petitions, the remedy should be sought in the
State courts, with review of State court action only by the Supreme Court of
the United States. ' 43 The legislative purpose was to squeeze the would-be appli-
cant for habeas corpus between the Scylla of implied waiver and the Charybdis
of Supreme Court denial of certiorari. There is little open water between the
two.
Waiver
As already indicated, the Judicial Code currently provides that a district
court may not entertain an application for habeas corpus unless the applicant
has "exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State.' 4 H.R. 5649
would have apparently overlaid this limitation with the further proviso that,
where no present state remedy exists, failure to take advantage of a previously
available state remedy-at trial, for example-would forever preclude resort
to the federal courts.
The proposed rule is grounded in the thought, articulated by the Committee
on Habeas Corpus of the Judicial Conference, that "a defendant on trial should
not be permitted to play fast and loose with the court in which he is tried by
withholding matters which he can bring forward, and then be allowed to raise
them in a subsequent proceeding instituted in the Federal Court, without time
limitation, and upon new and independent evidence, in the event of a failure to
secure a State court judgment in his favor."' 45 There can be little criticism of
the Committee's point if it really relates only to a deliberate attempt to mouse-
trap the prosecution. If, for example, a Negro defendant and his attorney
knowingly refrained from challenging a discriminatory system of jury selection
for the express purpose of injecting into the record a subsequently available
federal question, no good reason appears for cloaking the stratagem with the
mantle of habeas corpus.
Actually it is hard to suppose that under present practice such a wily defend-
ant would get a very warm reception from the district judge-presumably
there is mutuality in the principle "that habeas corpus is .. .to be governed
by the rules of fairness enforced in equity. '46 But, more important, it surpasses
42. The summary contained in the text is thought to be consistent with the e.xplanations
given by the Judiciary Committee, and by the Judicial Conference's Habeas Corpus Com-
mittee, which drafted the measure. REPORT 3.
43. REPORT 2.
44. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1952) ; see text at notes 17 and 18 supra.
45. REPORT 3.
46. Dissenting opinion of Justice Frankfurter in United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi,
344 U.S. 561, 573 (1953).
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belief that deliberate acquiescence in federal error is a defense practice of any
frequency. If the doctrine of implied waiver imported into H.R. 5649 were
to cover only such cases, it would be of no consequence.
But it would be a different and very serious matter if the bill, by reversing
the strong presumption against inferring waiver of constitutional rights, were
to shut off all federal remedies for the prisoner whose trial counsel, in an excess
of industrious incompetence, overlooks defects in jury selection or fraud utilized
to elicit his client's confession.47 The very recently decided case of Darcy v.
Handy 48 affords an instructive example.
Darcy v. Handy-like Leyra v. Denno, to be considered shortly-is the kind
of case whose procedural history Mr. Moody and the Association of State At-
torneys General regard as particularly outrageous. Darcy, in a trial severed
from that of three co-defendants, was convicted of felony murder in 1948.
Certiorari was denied 49 from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's affirmance r0
of the conviction and thereafter was also denied from the state court denial of
habeas corpus.5' Over seven years after the trial, certiorari was granted 52 to
review the Third ,Circuit's affirmance of denial of habeas corpus, 5 3 and finally,
on June 11, 1956, the Supreme Court affirmed.9 4 The immediately relevant
point, however, is that the issue which the Supreme Court at last considered
was not raised in the state court until two years after the state supreme court
affirmed Darcy's conviction.
When the Supreme Court considered Darcy's case, it concluded there was
no lack of due process in the fact that Judge Boyer, who had presided over and
publicly congratulated the jury on the conviction of Darcy's confederates, took
it upon himself not only to watch Darcy's trial from a chair right in front of
the jury but also on occasion during the trial to confer on the bench with his
sitting colleague. Now assume that the Pennsylvania courts had regarded the
issue as foreclosed after the initial appeal, and assume further that the Supreme
Court had accepted the view of three dissenting justices (and three dissenting
circuit judges below) that Judge Boyer had transgressed the bounds of due
process. It would seem an extremely rigorous view to conclude that the death
sentence nevertheless should remain undisturbed because the "able counsel" who
represented Darcy at the first stages of the case had not properly preserved
the question. Yet such a ruling may well be within the intended meaning of
H.R. 5649. It is possible, of course, that the Supreme Court might neutralize
47. Cf. Adams v. United States ex reL. McCann, 317 U.S. 269 (1942).
48. 24 U.S.L. WEEK 4330 (U.S. June 11, 1956).
49. 338 U.S. 862 (1949).
50. Commonwealth v. Darcy, 362 Pa. 259, 66 A.2d 663 (1949).
51. Commonwealth cx reL. Darcy v. Claudy, 367 Pa. 130, 79 A.2d 785 (1951), cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 837 (1951.).
52. 350U.S. 872 (1955).
53. United States ex rel. Darcy v. Handy, 224 F.2d 504 (3d Cir. 1955), a:firndng 130
F. Supp. 270 (E.D. Pa. 1954).
54. 24 U.S.L. WEEK 4330 (U.S. June 11, 1956).
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the proposed statutory language, should it ever be adopted, by holding that one
whose attorney neglects to preserve substantial constitutional questions has
not had the "fair and adequate opportunity" envisaged by the Committee on
Habeas Corpus in drafting the bill. But such a holding would not only undercut
the notion of waiver-it would verge on the conclusion that the prisoner had been
demonstrably denied his constitutional right to counsel.
Denial of Certiorari
The inarticulate premise of the contention that denial of certiorari should
foreclose further federal inquiry is that the Supreme Court is simply not to be
believed when it insists that "the denial of a writ of certiorari imports no ex-
pression of opinion upon the merits .... " i
Courts are mysterious institutions, and there is concededly no available sub-
jective test of the Supreme Court's sincerity. In this instance there is, how-
ever, an available objective test. The history of Leyra v. Denno,56 which Mr.
Moody and his fellow state prosecutors regard as among "the most signifi-
cant" 57 of the cases they rely on, plainly demonstrates that in the field of habeas
corpus the Court's Delphic pronouncements about the implications of a denial of
certiorari mean precisely what they say.
In 1950, Camilo Leyra, a middle-aged bartender, was indicted and tried for
the first degree murder of his aged parents. Admitted in evidence against him
were confessions made to a police psychiatrist and, soon thereafter, to others.
On appeal from the death sentence, the New York Court of Appeals reversed,
holding that the confession to the psychiatrist had been elicited by "torture of
the mind." 58 On the second trial, the other confessions were again admitted:
the death sentence was affirmed by the New York Court of Appeals, over the
objection that the subsequent confessions flowed from and were infected by the
first one.59 The Supreme Court denied certiorari.6 0 Leyra sought habeas corpus
in the federal district court. Denial of the writ 61 was affirmed by a divided
Second Circuit. 62 The Supreme Court granted certiorari, 63 concluded that the
subsequent confessions were likewise invalid, and reversed.64 New York then
tried, convicted and sentenced Leyra to death for a third time. But this time
the New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction and ordered the in-
dictment dismissed, concluding that "the prosecution has produced not a single
55. United States v. Carver, 260 U.S. 482, 490 (1923).
56. 347 U.S. 556 (1954).
57. See text at note 1 szpra.
58. People v. Leyra, 302 N.Y. 353, 364, 98 N.E.2d 553, 559 (1951).
59. People v. Leyra, 304 N.Y. 468, 108 N.E.2d 673 (1952).
60. Leyra v. New York, 345 U.S. 918 (1953).
61. Leyrav. Denno, 113 F. Supp. 556 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
62. United States ex rel. Leyra v. Denno, 208 F.2d 605 (2d Cir. 1953).
63. Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 926 (1954).
64. Leyrav. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954).
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trustworthy bit of affirmative, independent evidence connecting defendant with
the crime...."-6i
On April 27, 1956, after four years, eight months and thirty-one days in the
death house, Camilo Leyra was freed.60 Under H.R. 5649 he would have been
dead long since.
Because the accused was ultimately discharged from custody, the path the
Leyra case took is peculiarly dramatic. But it is not unique. There are other
cases whose merits the Court has examined on the second trip after refusing to
review the issues when first presented. 67 Plainly, therefore, denial of certiorari
cannot be equated with a Supreme Court determination that no substantial
federal question is presented.
This might seem to mean that the Court's disposition of certiorari petitions
is a hopelessly quixotic affair, that the discretion given the Court is misplaced,
and that the Court should henceforth be properly required, by legislation like
H.R. 5649, to determine certiorari petitions in state criminal cases as if it were
disposing of the cases on the merits. The diagnosis and the prescription have
surface plausibility, but no more.
There may be many reasons why a particular Justice votes to deny certiorari,
and these reasons doubtless cannot be canvassed in full without participating in
the secret conferences of the Court. But some factors affecting certiorari prac-
tice-particularly the factors operating in state criminal cases-are matters of
public knowledge; and they do not add up to judicial irresponsibility.
In the first place, no matter how worthy a case may look to lawyers un-
familiar with the record-or to the lawyer who made the record and is dazzled
with his eloquence in a losing cause-the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction if
federal questions are not properly raised or if the state court disposes of the
case on a state ground.
Secondly, "experience has shown that the Supreme Court does not now have
the time carefully to consider all the many certiorari petitions filed with it."' s
The Court has little enough time to devote to well drafted petitions. But hun-
dreds of the certiorari petitions filed annually in the criminal field are prepared
by the prisoners themselves, without benefit of counsel. Under these circum-
stances, untangling the jurisdictional facts and assessing the substantiality of
the questions sought to be presented is frequently an enormous task.
65. People v. Leyra, I N.Y.2d 199, 210, 134 N.E.2d 475, 481 (1956).
66. N.Y. Times, April 28, 1956, p. 29, col. 3.
67. See United States ex rc. Smith v. Baldi, 344 U.S. 561 (1953) ; Brown v. Allen,
344 U.S. 443 (1953); Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923); Frank v. Mangum, 237
U.S. 309 (1915). Cf. United States ex reL. Caminito v. Murphy, 222 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1955),
ecrt. denied, 350 U.S. 896 (1956) (denial of certiorari to review state court conviction, fol-
lowed by denial of habeas corpus reversed by court of appeals, certiorari being again denied) ;
Cranor v. Gonzales, 226 F.2d 83 (9th Cir. 1955) (affirming grant of federal habeas corpus
after denial of certiorari to review denial of state habeas corpus) ; United States ex rel.
Rogers v. Cummings, Civil No. 6294, D. Conn., Sept. 19, 1956 (memorandum filed, granting
habeas corpus after denial of certiorari to review state court conviction).
68. Letter from Judge Frank to Congressman Celler, note 39 supra.
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To legislate on the theory that denials of such certiorari petitions are deter-
minations on the merits is to do justice neither to the Supreme Court nor to
the prisoner-petitioners. Justice Frankfurter, in explaining why district court
judges entertaining habeas corpus petitions should not draw inferences adverse
to the petitioners from prior denials of certiorari, has sought to make this plain:
"We 'have repeatedly indicated that a denial of certiorari means only
that, for one reason or another which is seldom disclosed, and not infre-
quently for conflicting reasons which may have nothing to do with the
merits and certainly may have nothing to do with any view of the merits
taken by a majority of the Court, there were not four members of the
Court who thought the case should be heard. Any departure from this
fundamental rule in the type of case we are considering ought to be based
on a showing that these denials of certiorari, unlike all the other denials,
are in fact the essential equivalents of adjudication on the merits.... There
is certainly no more assurance that these petitions have been canvassed on
their merits than is true of cases within the ordinary domain of certiorari
jurisdiction.
"Indeed, there is less assurance that petitions by State prisoners could
be considered on their merits than is the case with ordinary petitions for
certiorari." 69
Manifestly, H.R. 5649 rests on a faulty analysis of the significance of the
Court's denial of certiorari. The nature of the error suggests that it is the
members of the Supreme Court, more than any other members of the federal
and state judiciaries, whose insight into the problems of habeas corpus practice
would be most relevant. Regrettably, the Justices had little to do with
framing the bill.70 Doubtless the bill's inadequacies are traceable in large
69. Separate opinion in Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 492 (1953). The Justice goes
on to say:
"These petitions for certiorari are rarely drawn by lawyers; some are almost un-
intelligible and certainly do not present a clear statement of issues necessary for our
understanding, in view of the pressure of the Court's work. The certified records we
have in the run of certiorari cases to assist understanding are almost unknown in
this field. Indeed, the number of cases in which most of the papers necessary to
prove what happened in the State proceedings are not filed is striking. Whether there
has been an adjudication or simply a perfunctory denial of a claim below is rarely
ascertainable. Seldom do we have enough on which to base a solid conclusion as to
the adequacy of the State adjudication. Even if we are told something about a trial
of the claims the applicant asserts, we almost never have a transcript of these pro-
ceedings to assist us in determining whether the trial was adequate. Equally unsatis-
factory as a means for evaluating the State proceedings is the filing of opinions; in
less than one-fourth of the cases is more than a perfunctory order of the State courts
filed. We would have to have very different records and to alter our consideration
of these cases radically if a denial could fairly be deemed to be an undisclosed de-
cision on the merits. In a few cases the issues before the District Court had not even
been raised here. In other cases, the emphasis put on the issues here differed con-
siderably from that put on them in the District Courts. . .
Ibid.
70. It would seem quite unwarranted to infer Supreme Court concurrence in H.R.
5649 from the fact that Chief Justice Warren presided over sessions of the Judicial Con-
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measure to fundamental misunderstanding of the role that is and can be played
by the Supreme Court in reviewing state and federal adjudications. 71
CONCLUSION
One might reasonably expect that an inquiry into proposed curtailment of
habeas corpus would start with the Constitution. That document, after all,
provides explicitly that "the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not
be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety
may require it. ' ' 72 But it is conventionally assumed that perpetuation of federal
district court habeas corpus jurisdiction is not constitutionally required, on the
theory that Congress is free to give what items of federal jurisdiction it chooses
to courts which, unlike the Supreme Court, exist only by congressional suffer-
ance.73 Moreover, the pending bill does not by its terms eliminate federal habeas
ference endorsing the bill; nothing in the statutory provision establishing the Judicial
Conference imposes on the Chief Justice the duty of representing the Supreme Court in
the deliberations of the Conference. 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1952). Scrutiny of recent opinions of
Justices Frankfurter and Black strongly suggests that at least they and Justice Douglas
would be unsympathetic with the proposal. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 498-99,
508-09, 511-13, 553-54 (1953).
71. H.R. 5649, if enacted, will mean that denial of certiorari from a state court will
bar any further federal challenge based on the questions sought to be raised in the certiorari
petition. The impact this will have on the task of passing on certiorari petitions, outlined
by Justice Frankfurter in the language quoted in the text, at note 69 supra, can only be
conjectured. But it should be noted that many certiorari petitions the Court might wish
to grant are beyond its jurisdictional reach because the federal questions apparently pre-
sented were not adequately raised--or not disposed of on federal grounds-in the state
courts. It cannot be presumed to have been the intent of the framers of H.R. 5649 to bar
future federal challenge where the objections to the petition for certiorari are jurisdictional
(such a construction might, indeed, exacerbate questions as to the validity of H.R. 5649).
There is, in any event, no way of telling from an order denying certiorari whether some or
any of the Justices voted to deny the writ because they were skeptical of the petition's juris-
dictional sufficiency.
The added burden in reviewing certiorari petitions from state courts which H.R. 5649
would probably impose would only be aggravated by the provisions of the second paragraph
of H.R. 5649, under which federal district court dispositions of habeas corpus petitions
would go directly to the Supreme Court on certiorari. Seventy appeals in habeas corpus
cases were filed in the federal courts of appeals in fiscal year 1955. DIRECTOR OF THE
ADIIIISMrATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITEI STATES COURTS, ANN. REP. 1955, at 160 (1956).
72. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
73. See Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch.) *74, *95 (1807); Sheldon v. Sill, 49
U.S. (8 How.) "441 (1850); Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868). If the
theory is sound, Congress, without "suspending" the privilege, can nevertheless nullify it
by simply withholding all habeas corpus jurisdiction from all federal courts: Congress may
not only give lower federal courts none, some or all of the -powers reserved to them in art.
III of the Constitution; Congress can also limit or abolish the Supreme Court's appellate
jurisdiction, cf. Ex parte McCardle, supra, and the unalterable original jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court probably would provide small scope for the writ of habeas corpus, for
federal or state prisoners. See Ex parte Dort, 44 U.S. (3 How.) *103 (1845) ; Ex parte
Bollman, supra; cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) *137 (1803).
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corpus for state prisoners; the remedy allegedly retains its vitality where no
other avenue of judicial relief was or is open.74 Finally, it is of course true that
until 1867 there was no federal habeas corpus for prisoners in state custody.75
From this it may be thought to follow that the constitutional grant of the
privilege did not contemplate--or at all events did not require-an available
collateral remedy for state prisoners. Nor is it likely that the Court would
presently accept the rather elaborate argument that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment retroactively inflated the scope of the constitutional privilege to include the
newly created federal rights to protection against state action.
But "what is constitutional may still be very unwise.
'76
W isdom here dictates other needs and other solutions. What is needed is
expert and painstaking judicial scrutiny, which can weigh on sensitive scales
the competing claims of individual liberty and state law enforcement. In order
to do the job with even greater care than is now exercised-and perhaps with
greater deference to the dignity owing a sovereign state's judicial processes-
present federal habeas corpus jurisdiction might fittingly be transferred to a
special three-judge Court of Habeas Corpus.
77
Such a reform would meet the real problem-vindication of fundamental
constitutional rights in a manner consistent with American federalism. But
proposals like H.R. 5649 would ride rough-shod over those rights, and over the
proud boast that "the great writ of habeas corpus, has been for centuries
esteemed the best and only sufficient defence of human freedom."
78
In short, adoption of restrictive legislation of the character proposed would
be "a tragic retreat. '7 9 For, aside from the limited supervisory role the Su-
preme Court can play, such legislation would effectively confine the policing
of the Fourteenth Amendment's mandates to the courts of the several states.
And, "unfortunately, instances are not wanting in which even the highest
state courts have failed to recognize violations of these precepts that offend
the limitations which the Constitution of the United States places upon enforce-
ment by the States of their criminal law."80 Nor is it a real answer to suggest
that state trial judges can, in appropriate post-conviction proceedings, correct
the errors of brethren of equal or higher rank.8 ' The understandable reluctance
74. Compare United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205 (1952).
75. See, e.g., Ex parte Dort, 44 U.S. (3 How.) *103 (1845), and see, generally, Col-
lings, Habeas Corpus for Convicts-Constitutional Right or Legislative Grace?, 40 CALIF.
L. REV. 335,350-51. (1952).
76. See CHAFEE, THE BLEsSINGS OF LIBERTY 89 (1956).
77. A similar proposal was advanced and later abandoned by the Judicial Conference.
See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 499 (1953) (separate opinion).
78. Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85, 95 (1868).
79. Don't Retreat on Civil Rights, editorial in The 'Milwaukee Journal, July 7, 1956,
p. 8, cols. 1-2, opposing enactment of H.R. 5649.
80. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 511 (1953) (separate opinion of Justice Frankfurter).
81. See, e.g., the confidence expressed by Circuit Judge Parker and by Ohio's Chief
Justice Weygandt in the availability of state collateral remedies as an effective alternative
to the present scope of federal habeas corpus. Hearings 11, 14.
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of judges to impeach their colleagues, or to flout the will of juries and the elec-
torate as a whole,8 2 together with the procedural complexities that becloud
most post-conviction remedies, 83 would appear to explain the striking dearth
of state court decisions sustaining collateral attacks upon criminal convictions.
Those who advocate curtailment of the writ lay special emphasis upon
the asserted need for judicial finality: at some point, it is urged, there must
be an end to litigation. As a general proposition there is, of course, much to
be said for the procedural devices which limit the suitor to his day in court
and his right of appeal. But the manifest utility within their proper sphere, of
res judicata, collateral estoppel, and the rest of that unfriendly but expeditious
tribe, should not so dazzle the beholder as to stimulate their application outside
that sphere. These concepts, like stare decisis, stem from the principle that
"in most matters it is more important that the applicable rule.., be settled
than that it be settled right."84  But where personal liberty is involved, a
democratic society employs a different arithmetic and insists that it is less
important to reach an unshakable decision than to do justice. It is for this
reason that, as Justice Frankfurter has put it, "the uniqueness of habeas corpus
in the procedural armory of our law cannot be too often emphasized." 85 The
habeas corpus writ "is in the spirit of our inherited law. It accords with,
and is thoroughly regardful of, 'the liberty of the subject,' from which flows
the right in England to go from judge to judge, any one of whose decisions to
discharge the prisoner is final." 8 6 Federal habeas corpus procedure does not-
and very likely should not--emulate the extraordinary liberality of the English
rule.8 7 But, as Justice Rutledge once observed, "the writ should be available
whenever there dearly has been a fundamental miscarriage of justice for which
no other adequate remedy is presently available. Beside executing its great
object, which is the preservation of personal liberty and assurance against its
wrongful deprivation, considerations of economy of judicial time and pro-
cedures, important as they undoubtedly are, become comparatively insignifi-
cant."88
82. It would seem fair to suppose, for example, that in many Southern or border states
an elected judge who ordered the retrial or release of a Negro prisoner would be jeopardizing
his career. See Statement by Circuit Judge Denman, supra note 39, at 5-10.
83. "As a result, many claims of denial of federal right, when sought after conviction,
are cognizable in state courts only with difficulty, or not at all." Note, Effect of the Federal
Constitution in Requiring State Past-Conviction Remwdies, 53 COLums. L. REv. 1143, 1145
(1953). See note 38 supra.
84. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (dissenting opinion
of Justice Brandeis).
85. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 512 (1953) (separate opinion).
86. Id. at 509.
87. See ibid.
88. Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174, 189 (1947) (dissenting opinion). In Wade v. Mayo,
334 U.S. 672, 681 (1948), the Court, through Justice Murphy, observed that, "the prevention
of undue restraints on liberty is more important than mechanical and unrealistic administra-
tion of the federal courts."
1956]
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The articulate premises of the attack on the habeas corpus writ are grounded
in the supposed first principles of judicial finality and of the sound management
of a federal union. just below the surface, however, lurks the less plainly articu-
lated but perhaps more deeply felt belief that the Supreme Court has grievously
erred in the sequence of great cases which utilized habas corpus to probe trial
records for fundamental error.8 9 Somewhat circuitously the suggestion is deftly
made that the real onus for current "abuse" of habeas corpus must rest with
those Justices who insistently and ceaselessly require that state trial procedures
conform with the mandates of the Fourteenth Amendment.90
If the Court has been too vigilant, curtailing habeas corpus would do much
to redress the balance. But those who see in these great cases judicial states-
manship of a high order-slowly educating the bench, the bar, police, prosecutors
and the mass of citizens to the highest traditions of Anglo-American law-
should look sceptically at attempts to circumvent the writ. Justice Black has
put the matter simply and well: "[Ilt is never too late for courts in habeas
corpus proceedings to look straight through procedural screens in order to
prevent forfeiture of life or liberty in flagrant defiance of the Constitution....
Perhaps there is no more exalted judicial function." 91
89. See, e.g., cases cited in notes 11-16, supra.
90. See, e.g., Hearings 3, 12-13, 42-44; REPORT 2.
91. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 554 (1953) (dissenting opinion).
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